Opinion: The Trouble with Iran
December 14, 2007
The Need for a New Iran Strategy: The United Nations Security Council’s Multilateral Approach Fans the FireBy Najmedin Meshkati
“There is no such thing as inevitable war. If war comes it will be from failure of human wisdom.” — British Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law, in a speech made before World War I
Last week’s release of an important assessment in the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate is just the latest development heralding the urgent need for a fresh new strategy in dealing with Iran. The estimate stated that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains frozen. President George W. Bush’s first comment on the report was, “I still feel strongly that Iran’s a danger,” and he hailed his administration’s “carrots and sticks” approach towards Iran.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) long-awaited report on the outstanding questions concerning Iran’s nuclear program, released in November, seemed as an empty glass in the United States’ eyes. R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary for political affairs, said: “We think that today’s report does not in any way, shape or form answer the questions the United Nations Security Council has had about Iran’s nuclear program.… Nothing in today’s IAEA report alleviates our major concern....” Iranian leaders, on the other hand, hailed the report as the vindication of their position on the nuclear issue.
Meanwhile, the Security Council is reportedly close to passing its third major resolution in less than a year calling on Iran to halt all its uranium enrichment-related operations or face possible harsher economic and political sanctions. Iran has called previous resolutions “illegal,” has refused to comply and most probably will defy other resolutions. In the midst of this rapidly deteriorating crisis, the specter of war against Iran — in the form of a “preemptive” military action by the United States, with support of Israel — still looms on the horizon, larger than ever.
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology hasn’t been driven by economic logic, and as such, it can neither be dropped under the threat of economic pressures from the U.N. nor be traded for promises of economic incentives from the European countries. Therefore, dragging Iran before the Security Council again will prove to be at best an exercise in futility, and at worst dead on arrival; because the move fails to address the crux of the matter: Iran’s need for a verifiable security guarantee from the West.
Iran’s motivation for developing nuclear technology, unlike Saddam Hussien’s, isn’t driven by militaristic ambition or a desire to conquer another country. The underlying rationale for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is a need to achieve prestige, assert national pride and secure what Iran sees as its natural dominance in the region. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime’s primary preoccupation, especially after the revolution of 1979 and what has happened to Iraq, is its survival, security and independence. Thus, Iran’s nuclear ambition is purely a political issue rooted in the complex U.S.-Iran bilateral relations.
This is the linchpin of Iran’s nuclear controversy, and it could provide the best bargaining chip for the West vis-a-vis Iran. As Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, father of India’s nuclear technology, said in 1965, “a way must be found so that a nation will gain as much by not going for nuclear weapons as it might by developing them.”
International economic sanctions, containment and military strikes aren’t sensible solutions to Iran’s nuclear problem. Iran has a strong and diversified industrial base, thanks in part to eight years of war with Iraq and the lingering economic sanctions for the last quarter of century. According to reliable sources, Iran has achieved full self-sufficiency in designing and manufacturing equipment needed to make machine tools for fabrication of uranium enrichment centrifuges. The country also enjoys a highly educated young work force and world class research universities, such as the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran.
Emboldened by the victories of their protege, Hezbollah, in an asymmetrical war against Israel in Lebanon, militant elements of the present hard-line ruling circle in Iran, if not actively seeking, would at least welcome a controlled, low-intensity asymmetrical confrontation with the U.S. and its proxies. This would enable them to fully justify their final consolidation of power and crush memories of the past reform movement. The West should avoid falling into this trap of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities, such as the under-construction Bushehr nuclear power plant, and deprive President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his cheerleaders from latching onto the assuredly sensational concept of “another Karbala in Bushehr” and taking advantage of the sense of victim-hood and martyrdom invoked by re-enacting the tragic history of Shia in Karbala.
Furthermore, technical know-how and the capability for developing the full nuclear fuel cycle, which includes uranium enrichment, isn’t simply limited to a physical facility that can be wiped out or neutralized by aerial bombardment; it resides in the minds of thousands of Iranian scientists and engineers. Also, in a porous world, sanctions are ineffective: They failed to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq; Libya didn’t buckle; and North Korea and Cuba survived. Successful examples of United States foreign policy have been based on constructive engagement: the demise of apartheid in South Africa; the decline of communism in Eastern Europe; and the progress of Arab-Israeli peace process. A policy based on exclusion and sanctions tends to radicalize rather than tame the target.
Late Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s methods for containing communism pushed China’s Mao Zedong to greater extremes, and his dealings with Gamal Abdel Nasser further radicalized the Egyptian leader. Likewise, imposing more sanctions on Iran will result in further radicalization, fanning the fire of hard-liners, and eventual marginalization of democratic forces in Iran. We need to find a way to support the Iranian private sector, which is the engine of economic growth and social change, to unshackle it so it can flourish.
It is a fact that a nuclear weapon-capable Iran would change the balance of power in the Middle East and challenge U.S.’s hegemony in the region. This isn’t acceptable to the U.S. and its regional allies. That’s fair and reasonable; however, it requires a paradigm shift in finding a feasible solution to dealing with Iran. Instead of blindly following the bankrupt policy of more sanctions, the U.S. needs to acknowledge Iran’s security and status needs and find a way to fully reintegrate it into the mainstream of the international community.
American policymakers should consider that the United States’ national interest can only be served through pragmatic decoupling of U.S.-Iran bilateral governmental relations from the romantic wish list of opposition groups and non-governmental organizations. This can only be achieved through bilateral, face-to-face, consequential (nuclear) diplomacy and direct negotiation between the governments of the U.S. and Iran. Their common goal should be to achieve and materialize a grand deal — a tangible, verifiable and sustainable security guarantee to Iran by the U.S. and its Western allies — in return for the compartmentalization and/or curtailment of Iran’s undesirable nuclear programs, its full and unconditional support of U.S.-backed government in Iraq, and its cooperation elsewhere in the Middle East.
Now is the perfect time to use the U.N. venue to start the direct negotiations with Iran. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, who is one of the Bush administration’s best and most skillful diplomats, is at the same time its most qualified individual to spearhead this undertaking. He enjoys many invaluable assets essential for this mission: He is of Afghani heritage, is familiar with the Persian culture and politics, speaks Farsi and is an unpretentious expert on the proliferation of nuclear technology. And his 1979 University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, “The Political, Economic, and Military Implications of Nuclear Electricity: The Case of the Northern Tier,” is a seminal, multifaceted study of nuclear technology development in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
President Bush, with bruised image and tarnished popularity, can use the remaining months of his second term to make some bold decisions that define the legacy of his presidency. A memorable final act to overshadow his debacle in Iraq, a finale that he has been seeking through the protracted Middle East peace process.
His Iranian counterpart, President Ahmadinejad, may not be seeking a legacy yet, but certainly both he and his hard-line supporters badly need publicity and legitimacy now and especially when his stormy first term expires next year. Given that Ahmadinejad is sinking in his gigantic domestic economic problems, only a spectacular victory in the foreign policy arena could temporary quell his increasingly disgruntled constituencies and restless young supporters.
Despite their apparent differences, Bush and Ahmadinejad have many other issues in common, including being under pressure from the vocal opposition elements in their respective societies and having to deal with a legislature in the grip of their detractors. While many foreign policy matters interest them, the stability of Iraq and the fate of Iran’s nuclear programs require their urgent consultation and attention.
One of the biggest advantages of being a lame-duck, second-term president is that Bush can act much more freely than any other policymaker. He can easily listen to his heart and conscience and ignore politically correct considerations that appeal only to influential interest and pressure groups. President Bush has the luxury of setting his foreign policy toward Iran, free from powerful pressure and interest groups. By choosing to ignore those parties and act swiftly, he could easily spare the future administration the burden of a very tough decision.
The U.S. can accomplish multiple national security and foreign policy objectives through direct negotiation, formal announcement that it will dropping the threat of “regime change,” and other verifiable security guarantees. Standing shoulder to shoulder with Iran would also result in further isolation of the extremist and rejectionist elements in Iraq and possibly the whole Middle East, leading to a revival of the peace process.
Through these means, Iran can be convinced that the threat to its security comes less from the United States than from its own paranoid and bellicose policies toward the West.
Let’s hope that we have learned from the Iraq WMD fiasco, and pray that both American and Iranian leaders demonstrate “human wisdom” in this case, following the advice of Andrew Bonar Law.
Najmedin Meshkati is a professor in the Sonny Astani Department of Civil/Environmental Engineering and a professor in the Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the USC Viterbi School of Engineering. He has been conducting research on international nuclear safety and security for the last 25 years. In his work with USC’s 54-year-old Aviation Safety Program, he studies human factors in aviation safety and runway incursions.