The Next President’s Nuclear Challenge
May 23, 2008
In May 1998, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. How will the next U.S. president deal with the continuing repercussions 10 years later? David J. Karl, an expert in nuclear non-proliferation and Asian subcontinent affairs, offers his thoughts.
Q: What were the effects of the 1998 tests?
A: Those nuclear tests catalyzed U.S. diplomatic involvement in South Asia in a way that hadn’t been seen prior to that. The tests brought home to U.S. policymakers how dangerous a South Asian arms race could be, and underscored once again the fraying Cold War-era non-proliferation regime.
Q: What does this mean for the next president?
A: The next administration will have to wrestle with thinking about a nuclear arms control regime that might no longer be valid. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968. Within the last decade, three nuclear powers — India, Pakistan and, more recently, North Korea — have emerged, and a fourth country, Iran, is on the pathway to developing a nuclear weapons capability. The new administration will have to ask itself whether the nuclear non-proliferation system is adequate to constrain future proliferators. Basically, it will have to decide whether to salvage the regime or replace it with something else.
Now that the Cold War consensus has broken down, like-minded countries need to band together and implement sanctions against proliferators. The next president is going to have a really tough time getting countries to work together, though. Global mechanisms like the United Nations are increasingly ineffective because of divisions among the great powers. For example, China doesn’t view the North Korean problem in the same way that the U.S. does, and Iran has its protector in Russia, so concerted effective action is very difficult. The U.S. will have to operate with a like-minded coalition of states to apply economic pressure, and this will require lots of diplomacy.
Q: How did the 1998 tests change American policy toward the Asian subcontinent?
A: One of the unforeseen byproducts was that it paved the way for subsequent rapprochement between India and the U.S. Specifically, the tests impressed upon policymakers the balancing role India could play in Asia and made them take notice of India as a possible strategic ally vis-à-vis China. While few would say this openly, some policymakers believe that India’s nuclear capacity shouldn’t be constrained because of this balancing potential. The civilian nuclear deal pushed by the Bush administration is partly a result of this thinking.
Q: Is this attitude likely to continue in the next administration?
A: Yes. All three candidates voted for the deal, so I don’t see any significant difference between them. And while a Democratic administration would be more sensitive to non-proliferation issues, I just don’t see them walking away from the civilian agreement, especially since Indian Americans are an important constituency and lobbied hard for it.
Q: But does this make it harder to convince Iran and others not to develop nuclear weapons?
A: It’s true that some countries have pointed to U.S. hypocrisy in carving out a special waiver for India. The question is: If India gets the special pass, then why don’t others? But ultimately countries will make decisions based on their strategic interests; I think that’s what happened here and what will continue to happen.
The problem with Iran has more to do with the global diffusion of nuclear weapons technology and with the Iraq war. Rogue regimes learned the lesson that you avoid Saddam Hussein’s fate by developing nuclear weapons. Iran has drawn the conclusion that its best insurance policy is a nuclear program.
Q: Does the nuclear black market have its roots in the 1998 tests?
A: The illicit trade predates the nuclear tests by many years, but the tests underscored the role of the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan, who played a very important role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
Q: Will the next president have to worry about Pakistan becoming a nuclear rogue state?
A: In terms of physical security, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are fairly safe, and the U.S. has helped bolster this safety. Also, a Pakistan without President Pervez Musharraf is unlikely to collapse or succumb to Islamist influences, mainly because there is no popular support for an Islamic revolution. The Islamist parties were trounced in February’s elections.
But there is a real danger of Pakistan — especially the tribal areas — becoming a base of support for Islamic terrorists operating in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Q: Do the candidates differ on Musharraf?
A: McCain has publicly praised Musharraf, so he might be more likely to continue U.S. support for him. Barack Obama would likely be less supportive, as he might argue that continued domestic instability in Pakistan is due partly to Musharraf’s presence. In contrast, current U.S. thinking is that Musharraf’s continued presence is essential to preventing anarchy. My own view is that the Pakistani civilian government would have the energy to concentrate on necessary domestic reforms if Musharraf were out of the picture, so I don’t think he’s indispensable.
Q: What issues will the next president face regarding the subcontinent?
A: The main issue will be the threat of terrorism originating from Pakistan. The current civilian government is cutting a deal with jihadi militants in the tribal regions that would end military operations if foreign fighters are expelled and attacks stopped. The problem is that this would bar the U.S. from its current military strikes in those regions, and the Bush administration is opposed to such a deal.
Q: What about India?
A: It’s likely that a new government will take office in Delhi in a few months, following the beginning of the next president’s term. Both new leaders will need to continue the nascent U.S.-India partnership that has been built in the last few years. Reviving the prospects for the civilian nuclear agreement will be one priority. Another will be launching a close partnership in the area of agricultural technology to promote a new green revolution in India and other countries with low agricultural productivity rates. Finally, Washington and Delhi will have to come to rough agreement on how each will deal with rogue states like Iran and Myanmar. India has closer relations with both, and this could become a greater irritant to the bilateral relationship unless a diplomatic understanding is forged.
Q: What are the challenges regarding U.S. non-proliferation policy?
A: The next American president will need to push countries to come up with a way to regulate an international supply for nuclear fuel, so states like Iran can’t use the excuse that they are enriching uranium for peaceful purposes. More generally, I believe that the non-proliferation regime has been eroding since the ’90s and that the next administration will have to work hard to build durable diplomatic coalitions, since the prospects of consensus among the existing nuclear powers aren’t promising.
David J. Karl is adjunct professor of international relations at the USC College of Letters, Arts and Sciences and director of studies at USC’s Pacific Council on International Policy.